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In July of 1996, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in United
States v. Virginia that established a new standard for determining the
constitutionality of an educational "experiment" that has been gain-
ing in popularity in recent years: single-sex public education.' The
facts of Virginia are similar to the two other recent decisions on this
topic, Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia and Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women v. Hogan, in that the plaintiffs claimed that their ex-
clusion from traditionally single-sex public schools violated their
Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
However, the evolving standards for determining violations of
these rights produced by these cases are now more likely to be ap-
plied to newly created systems of voluntary separation of the sexes.
These programs have appeared in inner cities and have primarily in-
volved minority children at the elementary and high school level.
Public educators have tried to use single-sex education either to pro-
vide inner-city students with the skills and self-esteem necessary to
succeed academically or to aid girls in math and science. Experi-
ments such as the all-male academies for "at-risk" boys in Detroit and
the Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem that serves
mostly black and Hispanic girls, despite their controversial nature
and limited success in the judicial system, have attracted the atten-
tion of school boards from California to Virginia.! The all-girl sci-
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law School; BA., 1995, Cornell Univer-
sity. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Jeff and Diane Boland, and to Greg Mucha, for
their love and support. I would like to thank Professor Seth Kreimer for his guidance in the
writing of this Comment and the founding members of the Journal of Constitutional Law, in
particular Mike Gold, for giving me the opportunity to be a part of such an exciting and chal-
lenging endeavor.
See 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
2 See id.; 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 703 (1977); 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
3 See, e.g., Daniel Gardenswartz, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An
Inner City Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591 (1993); Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a School Without Boys;
Experiment with All-Girl Classes Taps New Mood in Public Education, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at




ence and math classes have also garnered much support, demon-
strating a changing climate toward "separate but equal" single-sex
education at the same time that the Court has ordered one of the
nation's oldest male military academies to admit women.
The Supreme Court's attitudes towards single-sex public educa-
tion and the standard used to determine its constitutionality have
undergone both radical and subtle changes in the last two decades.
In 1973 in Vorchheimer, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Cir-
cuit's constitutional standard that required the showing of any "sub-
stantial relationshiy" between a "legitimate educational policy" and
single-sex schools. The Court articulated in Hogan and affirmed in
Virginia a standard for single-sex public education of "an exceedingly
persuasive justification" substantially related to an important gov-
ernment interest. 5 Although the wording of the standard was identi-
cal in both Hogan and Virginia, the Court changed its view on the use
of traditional gender stereotypes as a basis for single-sex public edu-
cation.
This Comment will explore the evolution of the Court's standard
for determining if single-sex schooling violates the Equal Protection
Clause, and it will attempt to predict, based on the Court's reasoning
and apparent attitudes towards single-gender education in the three
landmark cases, which current single-sex programs would meet with
the Court's approval. Part II examines the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Vorchheimer (the equally divided Supreme Court did not publish
an opinion) for deciding that Vorchheimer's rights were not violated
because Girls High provided girls with an experience equal to the
opportunities at Central despite empirical evidence to the contrary."
This conclusion stemmed from the Third Circuit's initial fear that
any limitation on single-sex education would lead to its destruction.
Part I provides an analysis of the Court's reasoning in Hogan and its
creation of the "exceedin glypersuasive justification" standard for
single-sex public education. Here the Court's concern shifts to the
danger of single-sex schools "perpetuat[ing] stereotypes of women.
"'
The Court accepted the Respondent's stated goal of affirmative ac-
tion, but it was only willing to find that a program met that goal if
"the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer[s] a disad-
vantage related to the classification" regardless of this rule's effect on
single-sex education as a whole.9 This section also discusses the 1983
Pennsylvania state case Newberg v. Board of Public Education, which
4 532 F.2d at 887-88.
5 See 458 U.S. at 724; 116 S.Ct at 2271.
6 See 532 F.2d at 885.
7 See 458 U.S. at 723-27.
8 Id at 729.
9 I at 728.
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reached the opposite conclusion from Vorchheimer.° Although New-
berg was based upon the same arguments and empirical evidence as
Vorchheimer, the divergence in result was in part due to the Newberg
court's application of the new Hogan standard." Although the court
in Newberg rejected the argument that this case was barred by res ju-
dicata because of the materially inadequate presentation of evidence
by plaintiff's counsel, the court's scrutiny of the inadequacies be-
tween Central and Girls probably would not have occurred without
the precedent of Hogan.' Part IV of this Comment deals with the
Court's affirmance of the Hogan standard in Virginia."5 The Court
here did not completely reject the notion that some single-gender
schools, in order to achieve "diversity" in education, may rely upon
the very stereotypes that the Court found intolerable in Hogan.
Finally, Part V explores the single-sex public education programs
that exist today or have been instituted in recent years. Specifically,
this analysis focuses on the failed male academies in Detroit, the
newly created Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem,
and various science and math classes for girls in several cities.' This
Comment concludes with some predictions as to which programs
would meet the Supreme Court's current standard and some sugges-
tions for an ideal program.
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE: VORCHdMER V. SCHOOL DISTRICT
OFPHILADELPHIA, THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP TEST AND THE
DEFERENCE TO EDUCATORS.
In the early 1970s, Susan Lynn Vorchheimer, ajunior high school
honors student, decided that she would like to attend Philadelphia's
prestigious academic public high school, Central High."
Vorchheimer claimed that the school's basis for the denial of her
admission, her gender, was a violation of her rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 7 She argued in a class action suit that the sin-
gle-sex institutions of Central High and Girls High (the only aca-
demic high schools in Philadelphia) were unequal in reputation,
10 See 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 682 (1983).
11 See id. at 700.
2 See id. at 705.
13 SeeUnited States v. Virginia., 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
14 See id. at 2276.
15 See Daniel Gardenswartz, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner-City
Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591 (1993); see Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a School Without Boys, Re-
periment with All-Girts Classes Taps New Mood in Public Education, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at
Al; see Ron Russell & John Wilson, 32 Girls + Science = Success, DETROIT NEWs, July 18, 1995, at
Metro.
16 SeeVorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1976).17 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I "[Nor] shall any state... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws..."
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facilities and funding.' Petitioner Vorchheimer asserted in the brief
to the Supreme Court that Girls High had not achieved the "first
rank prestige in the community" of Central not only because Girls
was initially founded as a school for training teachers, but also be-
cause girls' schools traditionally "have not served as the training
grounds for future 'leaders in all fields of endeavor. ' "'9 The Peti-
tioner also raised the argument that single-sex institutions did not
allow the boys to view the girls as their peers, but rather as members
of a "second sex" in "[a]cademia, [b]usiness, the [p]rofessions, and
[p]olitics."0 According to Petitioner, this conclusion would be
reached inevitably by both girls and boys in "a world and nation with
'a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.'" '
Adopting the general arguments that single-sex schools were un-
constitutional, rather than focusing on Susan Vorchheimer's inabil-
ity to attend a "coeducational facility for [s]cholastically-[s]uperior
students," ultimately doomed the Petitioners' position2 Petitioners
attempted to extrapolate the assertion in Brown v. Board of Education
that "separate but equal" schools for blacks and whites are per se un-
constitutional to separate but equal schools for boys and girls.' The
brief cited an academic study from the late 1960s which concluded
that "the pluralistic argument for preserving all-male colleges is un-
comfortably similar to the pluralistic argument for preserving all-
white colleges" as all-male colleges are "likely to be a witting or unwit-
ting device for preserving tacit assumptions of male superiority.
" '
Any type of segregation in public schools, according to Petitioners,
did not allow students to "adjust normally to [their] environment" or
"prepar[e]... for later professional training."' These analogies
gave Respondents the opportunity to claim that if Petitioners were to
prevail, the decision would signal the end of all single-sex education
in the nation. 6 Ironically, Respondents argued that if such an event
occurred, students like Vorchheimer would have less choice in the
type of school they could attend. "7 Thus, although the Respondents
had no empirical evidence that single-sex education would be the
best method for either boys or girls, they asserted that for single-sex
education to be a legitimate state goal, they needed only to show that
is See Brief for Petitioner at 5, 9, Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703
(1977) (No. 76-37) ("It is undisputed that 'in the scientific field ... Central's (facilities] are
superior'").
SI& at9, 16.
20 See i& at 21, 23.
21 1t at 23 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
See id. at 14.
23Sew- id. at 2 1.
24 Id. at 22 (quotingTHEACADFmICREVOLurION, 297-98 (1968)).
Id. at 34 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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it was a "reasonable" "educational alternative.""8 As the Supreme
Court had not yet resolved the question raised in Frontiero v.
Richardson of whether sex even constituted an "inherently suspect"
class at the time of its review of the Third Circuit's decision, it was
likely that the Court would view single-sex schools as such a reason-
able alternative.2
Faced with the apparent choice between allowing Susan
Vorchheimer to attend the high school of her choice and abolishing
the tradition of single-sex education in the nation, the Supreme
Court probably affirmed the Third Circuit's decision out of fear of
the latter.3 In its opinion, the Third Circuit court ignored the Peti-
tioners' findings of unequal facilities and academic opportunities at
Central and Girls.3 ' Even though the court conceded in the begin-
ning of the opinion that Central's "academic facilities" in the "scien-
tific field" are "superior," the court failed to mention this fact in its
determination that "Girls and Central are academically and func-
tionally equivalent. ' 2 The court's finding that "enrollment at the
single-sex schools" was "voluntary, not mandatory" did not take into
account the inability of students to attend a coeducational academic
high school in Philadelphia.33 Ignoring the Petitioners' arguments
concerning the "unique reputation" of Central in the community
and its greater prestige due to the number of "active, loyal
alumni... who hold positions of power in city, state and nation,"
the court decided that Susan Vorchheimer's desire to go to Central
was based ,upon "personal preference rather than... an objective
evaluation.'
Not only did the court manipulate and overlook factual findings
concerning the relative qualities of the two high schools, but it also
adopted the Supreme Court's developing standard for upholding
the constitutionality of sex classifications.35 Citing the district court's
analysis of recent Supreme Court cases regarding sex discrimination,
the circuit court established the standard as being a "fair and sub-
stantial relationship" between the classification and the state's goal. 6
28 See id. at 12, 14.
2 See 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973).
30 SeeVorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 430 U.S. 703 (1973). As the Supreme Court did
not publish an opinion for this case, for the purposes of this Comment, the Third Circuit's rea-
soning will be analyzed and assumed to have been the basis for the Supreme Court's ruling.31 See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d. Cir. 1976).
32 Id. at 882.
" Id. at 886.
54 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 430 U.S. 703 (1977);
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir. 1976).
35 See 532 F.2d at 885-86.
See 532 F.2d at 885-6 (citing Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 400 F.Supp. 326, 338 (E.D.
Pa. 1975)). The District Court considered Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
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Although the circuit court recognized that this standard was
"stricter" than the former "rational relationship" standard, which al-
lowed virtually any classification that could be linked to a specific
government goal, the circuit court did not attempt to define the
standard.37 Rather, the court provided a general summary of recent
Supreme Court decisions: "In each of the cases cited.., there wras an
actual deprivation or loss of a benefit to a female which could not be
obtained elsewhere. "'s The court reasoned that, in this situation,
"[i]f there are benefits or detriments inherent in the system, they fall
on both sexes in equal measure." 9 In distinguishing schools segre-
gated by sex from schools impermissibly segregated by race in Brown,
the court relied on the idea that single-sex education has "its basis in
a theory of equal benefit." 'o Race is a suspect classification, accord-
ing to this court, not because of the nation's history of discrimina-
tion against minority races, but due to thejudiciary's "commit[ment]
to the concept that there is no fundamental difference between
races."4 As there are undeniable "differences between the sexes,"
the court found that "the special emotional problems of the adoles-
cent years" justified the recommendations of "some educational ex-
perts" for single-sex high schools.42 By refusing to view single-sex
education in light of either the past discrimination against women or
the inadequacy of Girls High compared to Central, the Third Circuit,
and most likely the Supreme Court, decided that holding single-sex
schools unconstitutional would be merely an attempt to "'keep
abreast of the latest' in educational opinion."3 Out of fear that "all
public single-sex schools would have to be abolished," the court up-
held single-sex education primarily on the strength of a "contro-
verted, but respected theory" of education which served the ambigu-
ous but "legitimate" state goal of "innovation in methods and
techniques to achieve" the highest quality education while not caus-
ing any discernible "psychological or other injury" to either sex.'
The standard of constitutionality developed by the Supreme Court in
the recent sex discrimination cases was used only to establish that sex
is not a suspect classification. As the court stated, "[w]e need not
decide whether this case requires application of the rational or sub-
U.S. 498 (1975); Tiinberger v. iresenfe/d, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975).
SSee i& at 886.
S See id.
9 See id.
40 See idi at 887.
41 See id. at 886.
See i& at 886-87. Apparently, for the court, these justf)ing "differences" are only between
the social and sexual characteristics of adolescent males and females, as there is no mention of
disparate and inferior treatment of girls in the classroom.
See i&. at 887. (citing Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C. 1970) (rejecting a
claim by males seeking admission to an all women's college)).
See i4 at 882, 888.
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stantial relationship tests because, using either, the result is the
same."
45
III. CHANGING ATITUDES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
PERPETUATION OF STEREOTYPES IN MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN
V. HOGAN.
A male nurse, Joe Hogan, decided in September of 1979 that he
wanted to enroll at the School of Nursing of the Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women (MUW) because it was located in the town where he
lived and worked. 46 He filed an Equal Protection claim when MUW
denied him admission based on his sex, even though he was allowed
to audit courses. Unlike the Philadelphia school district in
Vorchheimer, the state of Mississippi offered affirmative action as its
important governmental objective and argued that single-sex educa-
tion was inherently better for women. Petitioner Hogan also did
not follow the line of argument presented by the plaintiff in
Vorchheimer that all single-sex schools were per se unconstitutional.
The Respondent's brief stated, "It]his action was not brought to
challenge the constitutionality of single-sex education in all its mani-
festations."' 4 9 The Supreme Court in this case was Willing to accept
affirmative action as an "important governmental objective.""0 How-
ever, the Court created a higher standard of constitutionality by re-
quiring the state to show that an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" existed for the classification."' Applying that standard to this
fact situation, the Court determined that Mississippi could evoke af-
firmative action as the purpose for this discrimination "only if mem-
bers of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a
disadvantage related to the classification."52 Despite Hogan's assur-
ance that the abolition of single-sex education was not the desired
outcome of this case, the Court displayed little apprehension in its
creation of a standard that would make implementation of any sin-
gle-sex program extremely difficult.
In evaluating the state's claim of an affirmative action justifica-
tion, the Court employed a "searching analysis" of the relationship
between objective and means to "determine whether the requisite
direct, substantial relationship between objective and means [was]
45 See id. at 888.
46 See Brief for Respondent at 3 n.6, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (No. 81-406).
47 See id. at 721 n.4.
See Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (No. 81-406).
4 See Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 5.
50 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
51 See id. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1985); Personnel Adminis-
trator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
52 See id. at 728.
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present." 3 The Court was primarily concerned with affirmative ac-
don for the sexes being in actuality "the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of
men and women." MUW's admissions policy, according to the
Court, was based on such stereotypes. As the Court pointed out, "in
1970, the year before the School of Nursing's first class enrolled,
women earned 94 percent of the nursing baccalaureate degrees con-
ferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the degrees conferred na-
tionwide." 55 There was no evidence that "women lacked opportuni-
ties to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of
leadership in that field."5 The Court found that "excluding males
from admission to the School of Nursing tendred] to perpetuate the
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.'"7 Thus,
the Court was completely committed to ending all sex-based stereo-
types, even if they were relatively benign. Hogan claimed that it
would be "a real extreme hardship" for him to attend another nurs-
ing school, not that MUW's denial of admission deprived him of his
only opportunity to receive a degree.1 Also, the "self-fulfilling
prophecy" of MUW's policy of only admitting women for a tradition-
ally female field did not harm women as a class7l The Court did not
refer to the Respondent's argument that MUW's policy cannot qual-
ify as affirmative action because it does not "encourage women to en-
ter fields heretofore regarded as male domains."" Apparently, the
policy's failure to compensate for past wrongs against women alone
made it an invalid affirmative action program. This Court wanted to
ensure true equality in education for the sexes, regardless of the
consequences to the institution of single-sex education.
Not only did the Court reject the state's main argument of af-
firmative action, but it also refused to consider the state's evidence
documenting the success of graduates of women's colleges.6' Peti-
tioners argued in their brief that such characteristics of women's col-
leges as a "supportive atmosphere geared to women's needs" and
"encourage[ment] ... to take leadership roles" would "be lost by ab-
sorption of male students into the student body "t2 The Supreme
Court disposed of this argument by pointing out that women in the
"See i& at 725, 728-30.
54 See id at 726.
See id. at 729.
5See id.
57 Seeid.
MSee Brief for Respondent at 3 n.6, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (No. 81-406).
9 See 458 U.S. at 730.
60 See Brief for Respondent supra note 46, at 19.
61 See Brief for Petitioner at 12-19, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (No. 81-406).
See id. at 12, 16 (quoting MARCIA K. SHARP, ET AL, A STUDY O. TtlE LFMNING
ENVIRONMENTAToOMEN'S COLLEGES 27 (The Women's College Coalition 1981).
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School of Nursing were not "adversely affected by the presence of
men" as auditors in their classes, making it highly unlikely that they
would be so affected by having men as classmates.63 The Court re-
ferred to the "uncontroverted record [which] reveal[ed] that admit-
ting men to nursing classes d[id] not affect teaching style,... that
the presence of men in the classroom would not affect the perform-
ance of the female nursing students, ... and that men in coeduca-
tional nursing schools d[id] not dominate the classroom."'" There-
fore, the gender classification "fail[ed] the second part of the equal
protection test" because it was not "substantially and directly related
to its proposed.., objective" of compensating women for past
65wrongs in the profession and the classroom. In contrast to the
Third Circuit court in Vorchheimer, this Court was willing to overlook
any controversial or ambiguous benefits of single-sex education to
ensure complete equality of opportunity to attend one's school of
choice.
The standard developed in Hogan reappeared in a Pennsylvania
state case with almost identical facts to Vorchheimer. In Newberg v.
Board of Public Education, plaintiff brought another class action
against the Philadelphia school board challenging the constitutional-
ity of the maintenance of Girls and Central Highf In response to
the defendant's argument that res judicata barred plaintiffs action,
the state court determined that only "inadequate presentation of
evidence" by counsel that "failed to meet the basic standards for
adequate representation" could have allowed the Third Circuit court
to overlook the glaring inadequacies of Girl's High.67 Included in
this court's findings of inadequacies were that:
there [were] 2.7 times more Ph.D.'s and 1.5 times more teachers with 21
years (or more) of teaching experience at Central High; Central's High's
campus [was] almost three times larger; ... Central High has more in-
structional equipment, including a separate computer room; ... [and]
Girls High students almost invariably scor[ed] lower than Central High
students in testing on the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test/National
Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test, as well as on the Scholastic Aptitude
Test.e
The state court also questioned the basis of the "vague, unsub-
stantiated theory of single-gender schooling" that the Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court so readily accepted.69 This court wanted to
know the identity of the "educators" referred to so frequently in the
See 458 U.S. at 730.
A Id. at 731.
6" See id.
66 See 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 682, 683-84 (1983).
67 See id. at 702-706, 702 n. 100.
' See id. at 703.
69 See id. at 706-707.
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Vorchheimer opinion.'0 Although these facts were true at the time of
the Vorchheimer decision, the Third Circuit did not consider these
"differences" to be sufficiently injurious to women to find these
schools unconstitutional. With the precedent of the Hogan decision,
the Newberg court viewed these facts as inadequacies for which the
"vague" and "unsubstantiated" benefits of single-sex education could
never serve as an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for their exis-
tence.7'
Although the school district did not offer affirmative action as an
objective of single-sex education, the court here was as concerned as
the Hogan Court with complete equality of opportunity for the sexes.
For example, this court focused on Central's superior course offer-
ings in science and math, a factor that the Vorchheiner court probably
overlooked because of the stereotype that girls do not usually excel
in these subjects.7 In light of Central's superior faculty, courses, fa-
cilities, and standardized test scores, this court held that diversity in
education was not a "compelling governmental interest" substantially
related to such disparate schooling."3 Also, as the plaintiff in Newberg
brought the action under Pennsylvania's ERA, which had recently
been the basis for a decision in a motion for summary judgment that
struck down a statutory provision prohibiting girls from competing
in athletics against boys, the court recognized that the "separate-but-
equal concept" of Vorchheimer did not "have currency" in the Pennsyl-
vania judiciary. 4 In the judicial climate created by Hogan and such
progeny as the Pennsylvania ERA case, the Newberg court simply
placed more emphasis on the inability of any girl who wanted to take
an advanced math class to do so at Central (Girls did not offer any)
than on any threat to the nation's single-sex schools.7m
IV. A RETURN To "CHOICE": THE MODIFICATION OF THE STANDARD
IN UN=F) STATES V. VIRGINIA.
The question of the constitutionality of single-sex education re-
appeared in the Supreme Court in 1995 when an anonymous plain-
tiff claimed that the all-male admissions policy of the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute violated her Equal Protection rights. The Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Virginia has established the relevant
standard to be applied to public single-sex education today.0 Al-
though Justice Ginsburg used the Hogan court's term of an "exceed-
1o See i at 705.
71 See id. at 700.
72 See id. at 688.
,- See id. at 710.
M Id. at 709 (citing Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Atfletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Cominw. Ct.
45,334 A.2d 839 (1975)).
"5 See id. at 688.
76 See 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
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ingly persuasive justification," this Court interpreted the standard in
a manner far more sympathetic to single-sex education." The Court
did emphasize the importance of truly equal educational opportuni-
ties for each sex, but it was less concerned with single-sex schools'
potential for maintaining gender stereotypes.
In its analysis of the specific facts of this case, the Court found
that Virginia did not fulfill its stated objective of diversity in educa-
tion.78 Ginsburg reached this conclusion first by recounting the his-
tory of single-sex education in Virginia. 9 She determined that "no
such policy" of diversity could be "discerned from the movement of
all other public colleges and universities in Virginia away from single-
sex education" and questioned "how one institution with autonomy,
but with no authority over any other state institution, can give effect
to a state policy of diversity. "8° Therefore, the Court held that "this
plan [for maintaining VMI as an all-male institution] serves the
State's sons, but makes no provision whatever for its daughters.""'
The Court then focused its analysis on VMI's "remedial plan": the
creation of the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at
Mary Baldwin College." Virginia argued that such a program would
not only create a single-gender college option for women, but that it
would also allow women to achieve "the results of an adversative
method in a military environment."8s An institution that provided
only these "results" and not the method itself was necessary, accord-
ing to Virginia, because women ultimately "thrive in a cooperative
atmosphere" and the "alterations" to this method that would have to
take place at VMI if women were admitted would "destroy" the pro-
gram. 84 However, the Court was unwilling to extrapolate its undis-
puted "assum [ption] .. . that most women would not choose VMI's
adversative method" to the conclusion that the state therefore has
the right to "constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely
affords."ss The Court subsequently found that VWIL did not supply
women with any military experience remotely similar to the unique
training methods of VMI. Ginsburg noted that VWIL students "par-
ticipate in ROTC and a 'largely ceremonial' Virginia Corps of Ca-
dets" and do not experience the "'barracks' life" of VMI where stu-
77 See id. at 2276.
78 See id. at 2279.
79 See id. at 2277-78.
so Id. at 2279 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
81 Id. at 2279.
82 See id. at 2282.
83 Id.
See id. at 2279. Virginia's expert witnesses gave testimony before the District Court regard-
ing men's and women's general tendencies. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407,
1434 (W.D. Va. 1991).
See United States v. irginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2280.
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dents sacrifice privacy to live together, eat together, and wear uni-
forms.' VWIL also had an inferior "student body, faculty, course of-
ferings, and facilities."" Like the state court in Newberg, the Supreme
Court was not satisfied with the "parallel program" offered to women
at VWIL that not only provided an inferior educational experience,
but also denied to women the "benefits associated with VMI's 157-
year history, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni net-
work."8a
Although the Court did not discount the possibility that single-
sex education in general could lead to the perpetuation of stereo-
types, as it recognized the need to take a "hard look" at "generaliza-
tions or tendencies" of the sexes "pressed by Virginia," it did accept
the stated objective of diversity as legitimate in the abstract." As the
Court stated, "it is the mission of some single-sex schools to 'dissi-
pate, rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications'" and
"[wle [the Court] do not question the State's prerogative evenhand-
edly to support diverse educational opportunities."% Such state-
ments reveal that the Court in theory would accept a single-sex coun-
terpart to VMI if such a school would provide an equal experience
for women, including the adversative training method. However, the
Court did not address the inherent question that arises from its
analysis of the failure of VWIL to provide an adequate single-sex so-
lution. If the Court believed that some women would respond well
to the aggressive and combative training at VMI, which the Court
characterized as stereotypically male, then what would be the pur-
pose of having a separate but equal women's institution?9' Ginsburg
acknowledged that the "United States does not challenge any ex -pert
witness estimation on average capacities of men and women."' In
this case, the capacities testified to involved men's preference for
"adversativeness" and women's preference for a "cooperative atmos-
phere."3 This feminine fear of competition was one of the factors
advanced by the state in Hogan to justify single-sex women's col-
leges.94 In that case, the Court found that such a tendency was
merely part of a stereotype that should be avoided even at the cost of
single-sex education.95 Therefore, the Virginia Court created a new
Id at 2283.
87 Idat 2284.
S I& at 2283-84.
See id. at 2280, 2276 n.7 (quoting O'Connor, Portias Pivgress 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1546. 1551
(1991)).
90 Id. at 2276 n.7 (quoting Brief for Twent)-Six Primate Women's Colleges as Amid Curiae at
5, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.CL 2264 (1996)).
91 See id. at 2279.
9IdL at 2280.
9Id. at 2279.
See Mississippi Univ.for Womenv. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,731.
95 See id. at 730.
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standard that does not allow for single-sex education such as was al-
lowed in Vorchheimer, where there were definite inequalities in the
peer institutions. The Court did not destroy the opportunity for
other single-sex schools, comparable in all other respects, at least at
the college level, to exist for the sake of diversity. However, with this
opportunity comes the danger that such schools may be based on
the very stereotypes that the Court claims to reject.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS AND
SOME PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE.
In recent years, public school districts have begun to return to
single-sex education either through experimental single-sex "acade-
mies" primarily for minority students or through single-sex classes to
aid girls in science and math. This return to single-sex education has
grown out of educational research showing both the traditional
findings of girls' improved self-esteem and leadership abilities in a
single-gender environment and some new conclusions, such as the
benefit fatherless boys can receive from being exposed to positive
male role models in single-sex classrooms.96 This section will explore
both those experiments that the courts have already deemed uncon-
stitutional and those that still must face judicial constitutional scru-
tiny.
A. The Detroit Male Academies: The First Failure
In 1991, Detroit attempted to "'breathe some life back" into the
academic careers of young African-American males in the inner-city
by creating three all-male "academies" for kindergarten through the
fifth grade.97 Educators believed that these academies could bolster
the "poor academic achievement of male students" by providing
them with an atmosphere in which they would be less likely to mis-
behave to impress girls, allowing them to receive the greater disci-
pline that they require, and "alleviat[ing] social pressures that dis-
tract both boys and girls from their studies."" The students admitted
96 See Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a School Without Boys, Experiment with All-Girls Classes Taps
New Mood in Public Education, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al; see generally Daniel Garden-
swartz, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An Inner-City Answer?, 42 EMORY LJ.
591 (1993).
97 See Gardenswartz, supra note 3, at 592; Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1006
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
98 Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination?, 105 HARV.
L. Rev. 1741, 1743-4 (1992). The author defines "poor academic achievement" with these statis-
tics:
Fifty-four percent of Detroit boys eventually drop out of school and over 66% receive
suspensions. Boys fall further behind the national average academically in almost every
successive year of elementary and secondary school. In the first grade, boys perform at
or above grade level on academic achievement tests. By the twelfth grade, boys' achieve-




to these academies were also supposed to be classified as "at-risk,"
meaning that they were primarily African-American males who were
likely, because of their urban environments and fatherless families,
to "manifest[]" their problems with "high homicide, unemployment
and drop-out rates."9 The curriculum at these academies was to in-
clude such special programs as "a class entitled 'Rites of Passage,' an
Afrocentric (Pluralistic) curriculum.... Saturday classes, individual-
ized counseling, [and] extended classroom hours. "'O As for the ex-
clusion of African-American females from these academies, the
School Board claimed "simply that co-educational programs aimed at
improving male performance have failed."'0 '
The School Board only addressed the exclusion of females when,
one month before the scheduled opening of the academies, the Na-
tional Organization for Women (NOW) and the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU) filed an Equal Protection suit, claiming that
the academies violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and
other federal and state statutes. The district court preliminarily en-
joined the academies from opening only eleven days before the be-
ginning of school."0 3 Issued before the Court's Virginia decision, the
district court's reasoning did not need to extend beyond the lack of
equal educational opportunities for both sexes that clearly violated
the Hogan intermediate scrutiny test. In response to the school
board's proffered justification, the court stated, "there is no showing
that it is the co-educational factor [in previously failed programs]
that results in failure.""' Despite the court's recognition of the im-
portance of the Board's motive of "keep [ing] urban males out of the
City's morgues and prisons," the defendant could not meet the bur-
den of showing a "substantial relationship" between this goal and the
exclusion of females.' 3 The court implicitly accepted the plaintiff's
argument that a class such as "Rites of Passage" which "teaches that
'men need a vision and plan for living,' 'men master their emotions,'
and 'men acquire skills and knowledge to overcome life's obstacles,'"
could be effectively applied to girls. After all, as the court noted,
"the educational system is also failing females" who must deal with
many of the same urban environmental problems as the males, and
some of their own, such as "pregnancy-related" issues.'07 Obviously,
9See Garrett, 775 F.Supp. at 1007; see also Note, supra note 98, at 1744.
100 Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006.
1o Id. at 1007.
102 See i& at 1005-06; see also Note, supra note 98, at 1746.
103 See Garrett, 775 F.Supp. at 1005; see also United States v. Virginia, 116 S.C. at 2306 (Scalia.
J. dissenting) (explaining that the Detroit Board of Education abandoned the plan after the
injunction was given).
104 Garrett, 775 F.Supp. at 1007.
105 Id. at 1008.
106 See id. at 1007.
107 It.
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such a program would also not pass muster under the current consti-
tutional standard.
B. A Single-Sex School For Underprivileged Females? A Doomed Experiment
in Harlem.
Since the ruling in Virginia, another urban single-sex experiment
has appeared in East Harlem: the Young Women's Leadership
School (YWLS).108 The school opened in September 1996, but it has
yet to face judicial scrutiny, despite the filing of a complaint with the
U.S. Department of Education by the New York Civil Liberties Union
(NYCLU) and the New York chapter of the National Organization
for Women (NYNOW). °9 These organizations claim that the school
is in violation of both federal statutory law and the judicial standard
of Virginia."0 The applicable statute dealing with sex discrimination
in public education, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (commonly known as Title
IX), prohibits federally funded single-sex "institutions of vocational
education, professional education, and graduate higher education,
and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education."' Al-
though the text of the statute is ambiguous as to the legality of sin-
gle-sex schools at the primary and secondary levels, as the court
pointed out in Garrett, numerous interpretations, including those of
the CFR and the Office of Civil Rights for the Board of Education,
have found single-gender institutions at this level also to be prohib-
ited."2 Also, despite the claims of Theodore Olson, the attorney who
represented VMI before the Supreme Court, and of Justice Scalia in
his Virginia dissent, that the Virginia case led to the questioning of
the constitutionality of such a school for "unpowerful and under-
privileged girls," YWLS would not have met the previous standard
under Hogan." Like the Detroit academies, there is little evidence
that the presence of boys in the classroom is holding these girls back
academically. The school's founders relied upon research based on
108 See generally Daniel Gardenswartz, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex Schools: An
Inner-City Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591 (1993).
109 SeeFirst VMI, Then.. ., WAsH. TIMES,July 21, 1996 at B2.
110 See Today: Education Today; Professor Diane Ravitch of New York University and Norman Siegel of
the New York Civil Liberties Union Debate the Issue of Single-Sex Public Schools (NBC television broad-
cast, Aug. 27, 1997) (discussing the issues raised byYWLS and the program's legal standing un-
der Title IX and the Virginia standard); see also 20 U.S.CA. § 1681 (1990); United States v. Vir-
ginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).11 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1) (1994).
112 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in ... any education program or activity receiving federal finan-
cial assistance."); see also Garrett, 775 F.Supp. at 1008-09.
113 See First VMl, Then.... supra note 109 (reporting that Mr. Olson felt that the threatened
suit was exactly like the suits he predicted would arise in the aftermath of the Virginia decision);
see also United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2305-2308 (19960(Scalia, J. dissenting) (predict-




anecdotal information and subjective findings to justify the exclusion
of boys. 14 For example, the school relied upon a study by the Ameri-
can Association of University Women which suggests that sexual bias
in public school classrooms and sexual harassment by male students
may be holding girls back academically, especially in science and
math."5
Even if these problems could be proven with certainty to be at the
root of girls' failures in public schools, which is not likely, the Board
would still have the problem of not supplying an equal opportunity
to males, as required by Virginia.'1 6 There was a proposal in Decem-
ber 1996 to establish an all boy's school in Harlem as a counterpart
to the YWLS." 7 However, this proposal has not yet been accepted, as
of October 1997, by the New York School Board.' The lack of en-
thusiasm for such a parallel program most likely stems from the fact
that this proposal was created in anticipation of the impending liti-
gation."9 A school created out of fear of a lawsuit rather than out of
a desire to improve educational opportunities for boys is likely to
have inferior facilities, faculty, and course offerings in comparison to
YWLS. The School District is also taking into consideration a 1993
Department of Education study, which found that "there is a clear
suggestion.., that for adolescent and college-age males, single-sex
schools.. . may not offer the learning advantages that they may offer
young women.""0 As the court in Garrett pointed out, the current co-
11 See generally Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a Sdmol Iit7hout Boys; Exptrim.ent uith AlM-ir
Classes Taps New Mood in Public Education, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996; seJudy Mann, BonxD
GuLsAPAR7;, SInGLE-SxEDUcAONjS Om- SCHOOL CHoicE IS yEEDo WASH. PosT, Oct. 20, 1996, at
C1. The lack of solid statistics tojustify the creation of the YWLS is not the fault of the school's
founders. Most empirical evidence concerning the benefits of single-sex schools is limited and
anecdotal. For example, Judith Mann, the author of THE DIFFERENCE DISCOVERING THE
HIDDEN WAYS VE SILENCE GIRLS- FINDING ALTERNATIVES THAT Ct,4 GIVE THEM A VOIcE, a re-
cent analysis of education's effects on girls, relied on a 1986 study of 75 Catholic high schools in
Chicago, 45 of which were single-sex, to reach the conclusion that "girls at all-girls schools
showed a consistent and positive attitude toward school, tended to associate with academically
minded friends, and expressed a greater interest in math and science.*
1 See Sanchez, supra note 3 (quoting one of the school's founders as pointing to the AALUWs
findings as one of the justifications for YWLS's creation).
116 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2282-2286 (1996) (discussing whether VIL
was sufficiently equivalent in substance to VMI to remediate the constitutional violation caused
by the state of Virginia's support of VMI and its single-sex admissions policy).
See Liz Willen, Boys Only School- Proposal Triggers Civil Rights Concem., NEVSD.kY, Dec. 11.
1996, atA4.
1S &e Tamar Lewin, In CaHfomia, lider Test of SameSx Schools, N.Y. TLiEs, Oct. 9,1997, at Al
(explaining that New York Schools Chancellor has decided not to open a boys' school as a coun-
terpart to YWLS).
"9 See Somini Sengupta, East Harlem Dstrict is Considering an AII.Bo-s Public Sehol NA TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1996 at B9 (stating that proponents of the all-male school consider it to be a prophylac-
tic response to potential litigation); see also Lewin, supra note 118 (reporting that Schools Chan-
cellor Rudy Crew decided against opening a comparable boys' school because he believed that
YALS was remedial, and therefore legal).
in See Sengupta, supra note 119.
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educational system has failed both sexes in some manner.'' The
School Board would not be able to identify an "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" for giving girls in East Harlem "small classes," a
decorative environment, school uniforms and same-sex role models,
while denying these benefits to boys or providing them with an infe-
rior institution. 122  If the YWLS comes before the courts, it will
probably will be found to be in violation of the Equal Protection
clause and Title IX.
C. Single-Sex Education's Only Existing Chance: Girls' Science and Math
Classes.
Although the Virginia ruling has already been blamed for the
probable demise of the Young Women's Leadership School, the Vir-
ginia standard actually allows more of an argument to be made for
the constitutionality of the girls' school. YWLS is based on such
stereotypical views of women as their need for a cooperative envi-
ronment and increased attention in the areas of science and math.'
23
The Virginia Court was willing to consider the legitimacy of such
general tendencies in creating truly equal single-sex institutions and
perhaps would be more sympathetic to the YWLS than the HoganCourt. 12
4
The Virginia Court's partial acceptance of the stereotypes it
claimed to reject may be the loophole for the constitutional legiti-
macy of the experimental math and science classes for girls that have
appeared in co-educational public schools in California, Illinois, and
Michigan.ss The argument could be made under the affirmative ac-
tion standard of Hogan that girls have been denied an equal oppor-
tunity in the past to excel in math and science.2 6 Proving such an as-
sertion would be difficult, as most evidence for it consists of
statements such as, "girls are steered away often in subtle ways from
taking advanced classes [in math and science], and the don't do as
well as boys on standardized math and science tests." 2  The key to
achieving constitutional legitimacy in these circumstances is estab-
121 See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F.Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
12 See Rene Sanchez, In East Harlem, a School Without Boys, Experiment with All-Girls Classes Taps
New Mood in Public Education, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996 (discussing the visible differences in
amenities and appearance between YWLS and other schools in the same district).
123 See id.
124 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2276-77 (1996) (suggesting that programs
designed to support pedagogically advantageous schools may be constitutional); see alsoJacques
Steinberg, Just Girls, and That's Fine With Them; At a New School, No Boys, Less Fussin& and a Freer
Spirit, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1997 § 1 at 21.
125 See Ron Russell & John Wilson, 32 Girls + Science = Success, DETROIT NEWs, July 18, 1995, at
Metro.
1 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729, n.6 (1982) (suggesting that
an othenise invalid program may be constitutional if explicitly responding to a history of prior
discrimination).
In See Russell & Wilson, supra note 3.
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lishing the "substantial relationship" prong of the exceedingly per-
suasive justification standard.2' If it could be shown that boys'
"dominance" and their greater knowledge and skill in science and
math classes prevents girls from learning, the Court may uphold
separate classes for girls. The rationale, under the Virginia standard,
would be that the girls' classes are necessary to provide them with an
opportunity equal to that enjoyed by boys in co-educational classes.
As long as the girls do not receive any special advantages beyond
learning the subjects at their own pace, such programs may pass con-
stitutional muster under Virginia
D. Some Predictions For Acceptable Future Single-Sex Programs.
Under the Virginia standard, the Court will approve public single-
sex institutions that are equal in every relevant manner, regardless of
any sexual stereotypes that they may be based upon. An ideal pro-
gram would most likely consist of peer schools started at the exact
same time, to avoid the prestige and alumni problems inherent in
Vorchheimer and Virginia. Physical facilities should be identical. They
would have to have faculty of an equal caliber, although the male
school could have all male teachers and the female school all women
instructors. Curriculum could include classes focusing on issues
relevant to each sex, including past accomplishments of individuals
sharing the students' gender and race. Finally, as the Virginia Court
revealed its willingness to consider the legitimacy of each sex's "gen-
eral tendencies" in designing pedagogically advantageous single-sex
programs, the methods of teaching could be adjusted according to
the dictates of research on the preferable methods for each sex, even
if one is "adversative" and one is "co-operative."2'
The Supreme Court has demonstrated with its modification of
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard in Virginia that it
is not willing to outlaw single-sex education, and in some circum-
stances may even favor it. However, the above description may be
impossible to attain, even if the difficulty merely arises from the fear
of a lawsuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The standard for determining the constitutionality of public sin-
gle-sex education has evolved from one constructed entirely out of a
blind-adherence to a time-honored tradition to one created to en-
sure equal and non-prejudicial treatment of the sexes while preserv-
ing the "choice" to attend a single-gender school. Unfortunately, the
12 See, eg., Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F.Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that
Detroies plan to create three all-male academies probably would fail to fulfill the "substantially
related" prong of intermediate scrutiny).
12 See supra note 124.
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Virginia standard will probably not succeed in efficiently achieving
either goal. Voluntary programs such as the single-sex academies for
inner-city youths will not survive under this standard unless the fund-
ing can be found to create fully equal institutions for both sexes.
Math and science classes designed for girls may meet the standard,
but may serve to enforce debilitating stereotypes through such pref-
erential treatment for one sex. The ultimate fate of single-sex public
education has yet to be determined. Until the next standard arrives,
the nation must wait and see which programs will meet the inconsis-
tent criteria required by the Court.
